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FROMJEANS TO GENES: THE EVOLVING 
NATURE OF PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE 
A. Mechele Dickerson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, all assets he owns 
are presumptively deemed to be held in, and controlled by, a sepa-
rate legal entity-the estate.1 Only property included in the estate 
can be used or sold to repay debts. Deciding what property should 
be included in the debtor's estate was not an easy task one hundred 
years ago because the Bankruptcy Act of 18982 (the "Act") relied on 
state law to define the scope of property included in the estate.3 
Deciding what property is included in the estate became easier 
about twenty years ago after Congress adopted the Bankruptcy 
Code.4 Section 541 of the Code contains a broad and all-
encompassing definition of the estate that includes the debtor's in-
terest in virtually all prepetition property.5 Notwithstanding the ap-
parent simplicity of this broad definition, technological advances in 
our society make it increasingly difficult for bankruptcy courts to 
* Associate Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School; A.B., Harvard-Radcliffe; 
J .D, Hamtrd Law School. An earlier version of this Article was presented at a symposium held 
at the annual meeting of the Creditors' and Debtors' Rights Section of the Association of 
American Law Schools. The author is grateful to Professors I. Trotter Hardy and Ronald H. 
Rosenberg for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. This Article ·was 
helped tremendously by practical insights received from the Hon. David H. Adams and from 
Marshall M. Curtis. Finally, this project would not have been possible without the diligence 
and dedication shown by research assistants: Timika Adams, Lavonda Graham, Christine 
Le\\is, and Agnes Makohka. 
1 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1994) ("[T]he commencement of a case ... creates an es-
tate."). 
' Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 696, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 
' See infra notes 41-46. 
' See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 [hereinafter the "Code" or "Bankruptcy Code"]. 
' See id. § 541 (a)( I) (defining estate as "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in 
property as of the commencement of the case" and noting that the definition includes 
Mproperty, wherever located and by whomever held"); see also infra notes 47-61. 
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determine exactly what constitutes "property" and who has the right 
to control or sell that property. 
This Article traces bankruptcy law's treatment of property of 
the estate over the last one hundred years and suggests challenges 
bankruptcy courts will face in the future when they analyze property 
created by (or dependent on) the Internet or biotechnology (i.e., 
"technoproperty"). Nonbankruptcy law has only recently started to 
explore the relative rights parties have in technoproperty. Because 
of this, the first bankruptcy court that considers whether techno-
property should be included in a debtor's estate and, if so, whether 
a trustee can sell this property to pay debts will be writing on a vir-
tually clean slate. 
The Article begins by discussing how property was originally 
conceptualized under non-bankruptcy law. This conceptualization 
has evolved from characterizing property as a tangible thing that 
only one person has the right to own, use, or control to characteriz-
ing it as a "bundle of rights" or interests that an owner (and perhaps 
others) can assert in something that is tangible or intangible. This 
Part then briefly discusses the growth in, and importance of intellec-
tual property, a major form of intangible property. 
Part III traces the bankruptcy law treatment of property of the 
estate. Because the Act defmed property largely in reference to 
state laws, bankruptcy courts interpreted the Act to narrowly con-
strue the term "property of the estate." This Part concludes by 
showing that, in contrast to the Act's narrow conceptualization of 
property of the estate, the Code adopts a broader approach that 
generally includes in the estate all property the debtor owns at the 
time of filing. 
The Article concludes by examining things that did not exist 
one hundred years ago and exist now solely because of advances in 
technology (i.e., technoproperty). Technoproperty defies some 
prior conceptualizations of property because of its inherent intan-
gibility and because, in some instances, it has human-like character-
istics. Given this, bankruptcy courts may be unable to rely on for-
mer or current conceptualizations of "property" and may have no 
state or federal court guidance when they decide whether to include 
technoproperty in a debtor's estate or whether to allow a trustee to 
sell that property. 
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II. DEFINING PROPERTY 
A. In General 
Most lawyers would agree that modern property is best viewed 
as an abstract right or a legally-constructed relationship among 
people with respect to things.6 In the past, however, "property" was 
viewed as a tangible thing over which one person had the absolute, 
indivisible7 right to use, sell, give away, leave idle, or destroy.8 
Traditional common law rules ultimately recognized a wider 
range of interest in "property" including leases, easements, and fu-
ture interests. Moreover, modern property clearly is not viewed as a 
unitary right. Instead, it is viewed as a "multilithic" concept that in-
cludes a "bundle" of disparate rights,9 including the right to use 
something, the right to prevent others from using it/0 and the right 
• See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY (4th ed. 1998). 
7 See WILLIA.'d BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR BOOKS, 
book ll, ch. 1, at 2 (describing property as the "sole and despotic dominion which one man 
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of 
any other individual in the universe."); see also ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAw OF 
PROPERTY, 1-4 (2d ed. 1993) (noting early characterizations of property as tangible objects). 
• See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, reprinted in CURTIS J. BERGER & 
JOA.\1/ C. WILLIAMS, PROPERTY !M.'D OWNERSHIP A..'\'1> USE 9 (4th ed. 1997) (arguing that 
M[m]ost people, including most specialists [lawyers and economists] in their unprofessional 
moments, conceive of property as things that are owned by persons. To own property is to 
have exclusive control of something-to be able to use it as one wishes, to sell it, give it away, 
leave it idle, or destroy it.") (emphasis in original); see also Kenneth Vandevelde, The New 
Property of the Nineteenth Centwy: The De~'elopment of the Modern Concept of Property, 
29 BUFF. L. REv. 325 (1980) (describing property as giving an owner an exclusive right to use 
it). 
• Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld is viewed as the primary architect of the "bundle of sticks" 
theory of property law. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Concep-
tions as Applied in judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (characterizing property as a 
legal relation between and among legal subjects); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions as Applied in judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); see also Jeanne 
L. Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration: The Myth that the U.C.C. Killed "Property," 69 
TEMP. L. REv. 1281, 1282-83 (1996) (discussing property characterization as a bundle of 
sticks). 
'" In some circumstances, property owners can also prevent others from using a likeness 
of their property, which sometimes can include their identities. See, e.g., White v. Samsung 
Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (reaffirming owner's property 
right to sue for the appropriation of ones identity, but holding that Wheel of Fortune letter-
turner Vanna White's identity had not been appropriated when defendant used image of a 
robot in a blonde wig with metallic, mechanical features in an advertisement). 
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to transfer your rights to someone else. 11 One reason (though cer-
tainly not the only one) explaining why modem property simply 
cannot be viewed as a unitary right controlled by one owner is be-
cause the government has increasingly asserted an interest in pri-
vate property owned by private citizens12 and because of the shared 
interests commonly associated with intangible forms of property, in-
cluding negotiable instruments (stock, bonds, notes) and intellec-
tual property. 
B. Increasing Importance of Intellectual Property 
The value and importance of intellectual property has in-
creased dramatically during this century.13 These intangible prod-
ucts-though not the tangible, fixed objects initially conceptualized 
at common law-are uniformly treated as property. The following 
sections discuss the procedures modem legislatures and courts have 
developed to govern how the property is created and the extent to 
which people can assert rights in such property. 
1. Trademark 
Trademark rights arise at common law and their registration is 
regulated by both state and federal law.14 An owner may register a 
trademark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(PT0).15 In general, once the PTO registers an owner's trademark, 
the Trademark Act of 1946 (the "Lanham Act") 16 gives the owner 
11 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 6, at 80; see also United States v. General Motors 
Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) (stating that property for the purpose of the takings clause 
was a group of rights that defined the relationship between an individual and a thing). 
" See generally Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REv. 1053, 1055-56 
(1989) (arguing that the conceptualization of private property changed from being one of 
"thing ownership" to the bundle of sticks metaphor because of the redistribution of wealth 
that occurred beginning with the New Deal). 
" See generally Weston Anson, Valuing Trademarks, Patents and Other Intangibles in a 
Bankruptcy Environment, 15-FEB AM. BANKR. INST. J. 29, 31 (1996) (commenting that "the 
overall value of American industry's intangible assets is increasing substantially"). 
I< See La Terraza De Marti, Inc. v. Key West Fragrance & Cosmetic Factory, Inc., 617 F. 
Supp. 544, 547 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Victory Pipe Craftsmen, Inc. v. Faberge, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 
551 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Dave Grossman Designs, Inc. v. Bortin, 347 F. Supp. 1150 (N.D. Til. 
1972). 
15 The PTO has the authority to establish procedures for obtaining federal trademark 
registration. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994). 
1
• See id. §§ 1051- 1127. 
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the right to prevent others from using similar marks if any confu-
sion, mistake, or deception would result from the use.17 
An owner of a trademark can assign the mark by recording a 
written assignment with the PT0.18 While the Lanham Act explains 
how to assign a mark, it does not address what a creditor must do to 
perfect its security interest in a trademark. Because the Lanham Act 
does not control the perfection of a security interest, most creditors 
perfect under the state uniform commercial laws.19 Courts consis-
tently hold that a creditor who validly perfects its security interest in 
a trademark pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) has 
a validly perfected security interest and is not required to record (or 
otherwise perfect) its interest with the PTO. Failing to properly 
perfect under applicable state law leaves the creditor's security in-
terest unperfected, an important issue in the bankruptcy context 
since trustees can use their strong-arm powers to avoid an unper-
r d · • 20 1ecte secunty mterest. 
2. Patents 
The PTO has the sole authority to establish procedures for ob-
taining patent protection.21 Once the PTO issues a patent, the 
owner has the exclusive right to prevent others from making, using, 
17 See id. § 1114(1). 
I• See id. § 1060. A valid assignment of a trademark must be accompanied by an as-
signment of the goodwill of the business (or at least that part of the goodwill that is con-
nected with the use of and symbolized by the trademark). See id.; see also Roman Cleanser 
Co. v. Nat'! Acceptance Co. of Am. (In re Roman Cleanser Co.), 43 B.R. 940,947 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. 1984) (noting the requirement that a mark cannot be assigned in gross but must be 
accompanied by the goodwill of the business). Thus, if an owner sells the trademark, courts 
generally conclude that the sale includes the goodwill and tangible business assets which ac-
company the trademark. See Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1984); United 
States Ozone Co. v. United States Ozone Co. of Am., 62 F.2d 881, 885-86 (7th Cir. 1933); In re 
Gucci, 202 B.R. 686 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
I• See In reTogether Dev. Corp., 227 B.R. 439,441 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998); In re 199Z, 
Inc., 137 B.R. 778, 782 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992); In re Chattanooga Choo-Choo Co., 98 B.R. 
792 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989); In re C.C. & Co., Inc., 86 B.R. 485,487 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988); 
In re Roman Cleanser Co., 43 B.R. 940,944 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984); see also Richard Lieb, 
The Interrelationship of Trademark Law and Bankruptcy Law, 64 A.\l. BANKR. LJ. 1, 10 
(1990) (-As a general proposition, if a security interest has been properly created and timely 
perfected under the UCC, the later bankruptcy of the debtor/transferor will not impair the 
secured party's security interest.") . 
. ~ See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1994). 
<~ See 35 U.S.C. § 153 (1994) ("Patents shall be issued in the name of the United States 
of America, under the seal of the Patent and Trademark Office."). 
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or selling the patented invention for a limited time throughout the 
United States.22 An owner of a patent can assign its entire patent 
right (or any interest in that right) to another party, and may record 
the written assignment with the PT0.23 
Bankruptcy courts have been asked to decide whether a credi-
tor is required to perfect a security interest in a patent under fed-
eral law (by recording its interest with the PTO) or whether perfec-
tion under state law protects its interest. Because the patent statute 
(like the Lanham Act) requires only that a creditor record an as-
signment (not a security interest) with the PTO, most courts have 
concluded that federal patent law does not preempt state law per-
fection procedures. 24 Thus, a creditor who complies with state law 
perfection procedures to perfect a security interest in a patent has a 
properly perfected interest that cannot be avoided by a bankruptcy 
trustee.25 
3. Copyright 
Federal copyright law is governed by the Copyright Revision 
Act of 1976.26 The Copyright Act gives an owner of "original works 
of authorship"27 protection against the unauthorized copying or 
publication of copyrighted works.28 Copyright protection (like 
trademark protection) exists in original works of authorship even if 
22 See id. § 154. 
"' See id. § 261. An assignment that is not recorded is void against a subsequent pur-
chaser or mortgagee who gives valuable consideration and does not have notice of the prior 
assignment. See id. 
" See City Bank & Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc., 83 B.R. 780, 782-84 (Bankr. D. Kan. 
1988) (noting that federal Jaw does not expressly state that creditors must file an assignment 
with the PTO to perfect a security interest); In re Transp. Design & Tech., Inc., 48 B.R. 635 
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985) (holding that a creditor is not required to perfect its security interest 
in patents by filing under federal Jaw but that perfection under state law protects the creditor 
only from competing lien creditors, not bona fide purchasers of the patent who record with 
thePTO). 
"' See sources cited supra note 24. 
"' See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994), amended by Digital MiJlennium Copyright Act, 
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
27 See id. 
" See id. § 412. Specifically, the Copyright Act gives owners the following rights: to pre-
vent an unauthorized public performance or display, to make derivative works, to distribute 
copies to the public, to reproduce the work in copies, and to publicly perform sound record-
ings by means of digital audio transmission. 
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the owner has not registered a claim with the copyright office.29 
Ownership of copyrighted material can be conveyed (in whole or in 
part), bequeathed by will, or transferred by operation of law.30 
Owners may (but are not required to) record a conveyance in the 
Copyright Office.31 
Bankruptcy courts also have considered whether a creditor is 
required to perfect a security interest in a copyright under federal 
law (by recording its interest with the Copyright Office) or whether 
perfection under state law protects its security interest. In a contro-
versial decision,~2 the court in In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd.,33 
held that because the copyright statute provides for a national sys-
tem of recording liens, the Copyright Act preempts state law perfec-
tion procedures. S4 Thus, unlike the conclusions reached in trade-
mark and patent cases, a creditor must comply with the copyright 
law's national registration scheme to validly perfect its security in-
terest in a copyright.s5 
4. Trade Secrets 
Trade secrets are governed by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
,. See id. § 408. ("Registration is not a condition of copyright protection."). Except in 
limited circumstances, however, an owner cannot receive statutory damages or attorney's fees 
under the Copyright Act if the copyright has not been registered. See id. § 412. 
"' See id. § 201 (d) (1). While the Copyright Act generally does not recognize involun-
tary transfers of an author's ownership of a copyright, the Copyright Act recognizes and en-
forces transfers ordered in bankruptcy cases. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) ("When an individual 
author's ownership of a copyright ... has not previously been transferred voluntarily by that 
individual author, no action by any governmental body or other official or organization pur-
porting to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership ... shall be given effect 
under this title, except as provided under title 11."). 
'' See id. § 205(a) ("Any transfer of copyright ownership or other document pertaining 
to a copyright may be recorded in the Copyright Office .... "). 
" For a critique of the court's holding, see Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests: 
'Where Intellectual Property and Commercial Law Collide, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1645 (1996); 
Elise B. May, Where Your Priorities Should Be: Analysis of The Perfection and Priority of Se-
curity Interests in Copyrights as it Affects Bankruptcy, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 509, 519-32 (1994-
95); Steven Weinberger, Perfection of Security Interests in Copyrights: The Peregrine Effect 
on the Orion Pictures Plan of Reorganization, 11 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. LJ. 959 (1993). 
" 116 B.R. 194 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990). 
" See id. at 204. Article 9-302(3) of the UCC provides that creditors who attempt to 
perfect a security interest in property subject to a federal statute that requires a national regis-
tration of the security interest (like patent law) must rely on the federal law's perfection pro-
cedures. 
" See id.; see also In re Avalon Software, Inc., 209 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997) 
(filing required at PTO to perfect a security interest in a copyright). 
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which has been adopted by most states. 36 Trade secrets are defined 
as any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information that 
gives a business owner the ability to obtain an advantage over com-
petitors who lack access to the trade secret.37 Unlike patents, copy-
rights, and trademarks, trade secrets do not give an owner exclusive 
rights to use the property.38 Creditors are not required to comply 
with any federal law to perfect a security interest in, or assign or li-
cense, a trade secret. Instead, creditors should comply with any 
state laws and perfection procedures.39 
III. PROPERTY OF THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE 
A. Treatment Under the Act 
Under the Bankruptcy Act, courts construed property of the es-
tate to include only those assets that the debtor owned as of the date 
he filed his bankruptcy petition and could be used to pay creditors' 
claims.40 While the term "property" as used in § 70 of the Act was to 
be given a broad interpretation,41 the Act defined property largely 
by incorporating substantive rules of state law. However, courts ex-
cluded from the estate any property that could not be transferred or 
assigned under applicable nonbankruptcy law,42 property that a 
debtor could exempt under applicable state law, 43 certain property 
"' See UNIF. TRADE SECRETSACf, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985). 
" See REsTATEMENT OF TORTS§ 757 (1939); c£ UNIF. TRADE SECRETSAcr § 1, at 438-39 
(broadly defining "trade secret"). 
,. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1 cmt. 
,. See Evelyn M. Sommer, Acquisition and Divestiture of Intellectual Property, 458 
PLI/CORP. 677 (1984). 
"' See The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 696, 30 Stat. 544, § llO(a) (repealed 
1978) ("The trustee of the estate ... shall ..• be vested with the tide of the bankrupt as of the 
date of the filing of the petition ..• except insofar as it is to property which is held to be ex-
empt .... "). 
" See Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966) (purpose of§ 70a(5) is to secure for 
creditors everything of value that the bankrupt owns at the time the petition is filed). 
" See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 696, 30 Stat. 544, § 70a(5) (repealed 1978); 
seealsoTignorv. Parkison, 729 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1984); Vern Countryman, The Use of 
State La!V in Bankruptcy Cases (Part I), 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 407, 432 (1972) (noting that non-
bankruptcy law must be consulted to determine both whether "the bankruptcy had anything 
that might be called 'property'" and whether the property "could be reached by judicial 
process") . 
.., See Lockwood v. Exch. Bank, 190 U.S. 294 (1903); see also In re Buda, 323 F.2d 748 
(7th Cir. 1963) (holding that causes of action that are exempt under state law are excluded 
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encumbered by liens,44 and certain causes of action.45 Moreover, to 
provide the bankrupt with sufficient assets to survive and thrive in 
the future, courts often excluded property from the estate to ensure 
that bankrupts had the ability to make an "unencumbered fresh 
start."46 
B. Treatment Under the Code 
1. Property Included- In General 
The Code takes a more comprehensive approach to character-
izing property of the estate than the approach Congress took when 
it enacted the Bankruptcy Act. Section 541 provides that the com-
mencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate and then defines 
"estate" to include all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in 
property, wherever located and by whomever held at the time the 
bankruptcy case commences.47 While the Code never defines what 
constitutes "property," courts broadly construe property to include 
everything of value the debtor possesses even if the property, or the 
debtor's interest in that property, is "novel. "48 Adopting a broad, 
from the estate); In re Lamb, 272 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. La. 1967) (holding that cash surrender 
value of insurance policies on debtor's life is exempt under state law and, thus, is not part of 
the estate). 
" See Sayers v. Forsyth Bldg. Corp., 417 F.2d 65, 72 (5th Cir. 1969) (finding that, be-
cause default judgment creates a lien on property and is subject to enforcement proceedings 
to satisfy the judgment debt, property encumbered by such a lien is excluded from the es-
tate). 
" See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 696, 30 Stat. 544, § llO(a) (repealed 1978) 
("[R]ights of action ... for libel, slander, injuries to the person of the bankruptcy or of a rela-
tive ... seduction, and criminal conversation shall not vest in the trustee unless by the Jaw of 
the State such rights of action are subject to attachment, execution, garnishment, sequestra-
tion, or other judicial process .... "). 
"' See Segal, 382 U.S. at 380 (refusing to construe tax refund as property under 
§ 70a(5)); see also Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970). 
" Section 541 (a) (1) specifically lists some, but not all, property that is included in the 
debtor's estate. For example, estate property includes any interest the debtor has in commu-
nity property if the debtor either solely or jointly manages and controls the property or if 
creditors could assert a claim against the property. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a) (2) (1994). The 
estate also includes property the trustee recovers from certain third parties or property trans-
ferred to the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) and (a)(4). Finally, the estate includes prop-
erty a debtor acquires or becomes entitled to acquire within 180 days after the bankruptcy 
filing. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a) (5). 
'" See In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc., 226 B.R. 227, 233-34 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) 
(including in property of the estate the right to make or revoke an election to be treated as a 
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comprehensive definition independent of the vagaries of state law 
eliminates most of the uncertainty concerning which assets can be 
sold to pay a debtor's debts.49 Indeed, to clarify that the Code re-
jected the Act's reliance on state law to define estate property, 
§ 541 (c) (1) explicitly provides that the estate includes property 
even if applicable nonbankruptcy law restricts the debtor's ability to 
transfer the property, or if the property is governed by an agree-
ment that conditions a debtor's interest in the property on the 
debtor's financial solvency. 50 
Several types of property that would have been excluded from 
an Act estate are now included in the Code estate. For example, the 
Code does not exclude property simply because the debtor could 
exempt it under applicable state or federal law. Instead, § 541 in-
cludes virtually all property in the estate, though debtors may be 
able to exempt property under§ 522.51 In addition, an Act estate 
generally excluded a bankrupt's unpaid wagel2 unless: (1) the 
debtor could assign those wages under applicable state law5' and (2) 
the wages were sufficiently rooted in the bankrupt's prebankruptcy 
past.54 In contrast, the modern estate includes all accrued (but yet 
unpaid) wages and accrued vacation pay as long as the debtor has 
subchapter S corporation for federal income tax purposes). 
49 See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204-205 (1983) (noting that 
congressional reports indicate that§ 54l(a)(l)'s scope is broad); In re Edgeworth, 993 F.2d 
51, 55 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Geise, 992 F.2d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 1993); In re Prudoff, 186 B.R. 
64, 66 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995). 
50 See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (c)(1). While this provision allows a debtor to transfer property to 
the estate that would otherwise be nonassignable, the transferred property retains all other 
restrictions that accompany the property. See In re Dean, 174 B.R. 787,791 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 
1994) (holding that trustee succeeds to the debtor's contractual rights including any restric-
tions on transfer); In re Rouse, 48 B.R. 236, 240 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (stating that interest 
that is limited in the hands of the debtor also is limited if held by the estate). 
" 11 U.S.C. § 522 (b) and (d) describes how debtors can exempt property from prop-
erty of the estate. 
" See Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970) (holding that accrued but unpaid vacation 
pay is not property under§ 70a(5)). 
" See Kolb v. Berlin, 356 F.2d 269, 271 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that accrued wages are 
included in the estate only if the wages could be transferred under applicable non-
bankruptcy law). 
" See Waldschmidt v. CBS, Inc., 14 B.R. 309, 312 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981) (holding 
that royalty payments owed to debtor are property within the scope of§ 70a(5) of the Act); 
Hudson v. Wylie, 242 F.2d 435, 44344 (9th Cir. 1957) (finding that the right to share in 
profits as a result of a joint venture had such a "present and calculable value" as to become 
part of the estate). 
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an unconditional right to those funds.55 
Similarly, property of an Act estate included only those causes 
of action that the debtor could transfer or assign (or a creditor 
could levy on) under applicable state law.56 The Code eliminated 
this restriction by including all causes of action in the estate 57 unless 
the debtor would be precluded from bringing the lawsuit under 
nonbankruptcy law.58 Finally, an Act estate did not include a 
debtor's interest in real property held as tenants by the entirety.59 
In contrast, the Code includes a debtor's interest in entireties prop-
erty60 even if the debtor's spouse has not filed a bankruptcy peti-
• 61 
uon. 
" See In re Tully, 202 B.R. 481, 483 (BAP. 9th Cir. 1996) (holding that chapter 7 
debtor's real estate commission pending in escrow at filing constituted property of the es-
tate); In re Palmer, 57 B.R. 332 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986) (finding that a year-end bonus was not 
property of the estate because the debtor's right to receive the bonus was conditioned on a 
number of events); In re Bernstein, 34 B.R. 611 (Bankr. Colo. 1983) (holding that accrued 
but unpaid annual leave was property of the estate). 
"' See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 696, 30 Stat. 544, § llO(a) (repealed 1978); 
see also Carmona v. Robinson, 336 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1964) (interpreting California law); 
Sa per''· Delgado, 146 F.2d 714, 715 (2d Cir. 1945) (interpreting New York law). 
" See In re RCS Engineered Prods. Co., 102 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 1996); Sender v. 
Simon, 84 F.3d 1299, 1304 (lOth Cir. 1996); In re Wischan, 77 F. 3d 875, 877 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(personal injury claims included in estate even if the claims are nontransferable or non-
assignable under applicable state law); Sierra Switchboard Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
789 F.2d 705, 708-709 (9th Cir. 1986); Tignor v. Parkinson, 729 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir. 1984) 
(emotional distress claim included even if nontransferable under applicable state law); 
Shirkeyv. Leake, 715 F.2d 859, 863 (4th Cir. 1983); In re Schepps Food Stores, Inc., 160 B.R. 
792 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993) (derivative suit included in Code estate); see also In re Ira Haupt 
& Co., 274 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (shareholders' derivative action excluded from Act 
estate). 
"' See In re Van Dresser Corp., 128 F.3d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[I]f the cause of ac-
tion does not explicitly or implicitly allege harm to the debtor, then the cause of action could 
not have been asserted by the debtor as of the commencement of the case, and thus is not 
property of the estate."); see also In re Educators Group Health Trust, 25 F.3d 1281 (5th Cir. 
1994). 
"' See In re Pauquette, 38 B.R. 170, 173 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984). 
"" See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(1) (1994); see also Pauquette, 38 B.R. at 173; D'Avignon v. 
Palmisano, 34 B.R. 796, 798 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982); In re Ford, 3 B.R. 559,570 (Bankr. D. Md. 
1980) . 
• , See generally In re Lashley, 206 B.R. 950, 953 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1997) (allowing 
debtor spouse to avoid creditor's lien on entirety property); In re Himmelstein, 203 B.R. 
1009, 1014 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (including entirety property in estate but preventing joint 
creditor from selling property unless claim is reduced to judgment); In re Dawson, 10 B.R. 
680, 684 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981) (limiting ability to sell entirety property because of the 
harm to nondebtor spouse); In re Shaw, 5 B.R. 107, llO (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980) (noting 
problem caused by "staggered filings of bankruptcy that are calculated to frustrate the inter-
ests of creditors of both spouses"). 
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2. Intellectual Property 
Interests an owner has in intellectual property62 and all agree-
ments governing intellectual property rights are included as prop-
erty of the estate like other types of property and other contractual 
rights.63 Disputes involving a debtor's ownership of intellectual 
property have grown substantially over the last one hundred years.64 
In some instances, a debtor's ownership of, or license interests in, 
intellectual property may be the only, or most valuable, asset of the 
estate. 65 Because of this, bankruptcy courts increasingly are re-
quired to engage in detailed analyses of a debtor's interest in intel-
lectual property. 66 
Since Congress made a conscious decision to have a broad, in-
clusive defmition of property, it is somewhat surprising that, when 
interpreting the respective property interests debtors, creditors, and 
others have in intellectual property, bankruptcy courts tend to pro-
tect the property rights of nondebtors. For example, the court in In 
re Audiofidelity Enterprises, Inc.67 ordered a debtor to destroy ma-
terials that infringed the copyright rights of another party even 
though the estate would have received $300,000 if the court had al-
lowed the debtor to sell the materials.68 Indeed, in virtually all cases 
involving a conflict between two federal statutes or conflicting state 
and federal policies, courts will protect the nondebtor's property 
" The Code includes within the definition of intellectual property trade secrets, pat-
ents, patent applications, and copyright protected works. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (35) (A). Sqr-
prisingly, trademarks are not included in this definition. 
"' See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); see also United States v. Inslaw Inc., 932 F.2d 1467, 1471 
(D.C. Cir. 1991); In re McGee, 157 B.R. 966, 975 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993); Chesapeake Fiber 
Pkg. v. Sebro Packing Corp., 143 B.R. 360 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992). 
"' See Anson, supra note 13, at 29. 
65 See In re Cucci, 202 B.R. 686 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that debtor's sole busi-
ness was the licensing of his name and that his name and trademark (Paolo Gucci) was the 
estate's most valuable asset); see also Anson, supra note 13, at 29 (describing intangible assets 
ofMacy's and Western Union as key assets of the estate). 
66 For example, the court in In re C Tek Software, Inc., 127 B.R. 501, 503-07 (Bankr. 
D.N.H. 1991), considered whether a distributor who modified the source code of computer 
software it licensed from the debtor had a copyright interest in the source code and whether 
the creditor who had a security interest in the software also had an interest in the distributor's 
modifications. See also In re Cambridge Biotech Corp., 186 B.R. 9 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) 
(analyzing whether debtor infringed patents for methods to detect the AIDS virus). 
67 103 B.R. 544 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1989). 
68 See id. at 547-48. But cf. Lieb, supra note 19, at 5 (suggesting that trademark law 
"often bends to the goals of bankruptcy law in trademark-related proceedings decided in 
bankruptcy courts"). 
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rights even when doing so potentially removes valuable assets from 
the estate or hinders the debtor's ability to reorganize.69 
3. Property Excluded 
Section 541 does, however, exclude some property from the es-
tate.70 For example, the Code excludes any power or interest the 
debtor holds in property that is designed to benefit another.71 In 
addition, consistent with the Act's treatment of pension benefits, 
§ 541 (c) (2) excludes from the estate an interest the debtor has in a 
trust which contains a restriction on transfer that is enforceable un-
der applicable nonbankruptcy law.72 
"' See, e.g., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 
(1986) (holding that bankruptcy trustee may not abandon property in contravention of state 
statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from 
identified hazards). 
"' It is unfortunate that Congress created narrow exclusions, as doing so creates the ap-
pearance that the exceptions were enacted solely to satisfY the demands of special interest 
groups. For example, § 541 (b) (5) (A) and (B) exclude "any interest in cash or cash equiva-
lents that constitute proceeds of a sale by the debtor of a money order ... on or after the date 
that is 14 days prior to the date on which the petition is filed ... under an agreement ... that 
prohibits the commingling of such proceeds with property of the debtor." 11 U.S.C. 
§ 541(b)(5)(A), (B). Instead of being the "money order issuer exception to property of the 
estate," this exclusion could have broadly excluded all property a debtor holds in a trust for 
others for a certain period pre-petition. Money order issuers could still benefit from this pro-
tection as long as (1) they modified their agreements to provide that all sales are held in trust 
and that the money order seller is prohibited from commingling the proceeds and (2) they 
established safeguards to ensure that money order sellers comply with these requirements. 
" Section 541(b)(l) excludes any "power" the debtor exercises solely for third-party 
beneficiaries. Thus, if the debtor is the trustee of a spendthrift trust, the trustee could not 
exercise the power to determine the amount of the distribution of trust proceeds to benefici-
aries under the trust. Likewise,§ 541(d) excludes property in which the debtor holds only 
legal title, not an equitable interest. Thus, if the debtor is the trustee of a spendthrift trust, 
the bankruptcy trustee could not treat the trust benefits as estate property. See, e.g., Begier 
v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58-59 (1990); Sierra Steel, Inc. v. S & S Steel Fabrication (In re Sierra 
Steel, Inc.), 96 B.R. 271, 273 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989). 
,., This provision protects a debtor's interest in a spendthrift trust. See In re Newman, 
903 F.2d 1150, 1152 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Moody, 837 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1988). The Su-
preme Court in Patterson l'. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992), clarified that this provision pro-
tects a debtor's interest in proceeds of an ERISA-qualified pension plan that contains an anti-
assignment and nonalienation clause. Because individual retirement accounts do not contain 
the anti-assignment or anti-alienation provisions contained in ERISA-qualified plans, they are 
not excluded from a debtor's estate under§ 541. See, e.g., Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78, 82 
(3d Cir. 1991); In re Brilley, 148 B.R. 39, 41 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1992); In re Herbert, 140 B.R. 
174, 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992). 
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IV. THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF TECHNOPROPERTY 
Because of advances in technology, people now own or control 
"things" that did not exist when Congress enacted either the Act or 
the Code. The remainder of this Article discusses two types of 
"things," Internet-related property and biotechnology property, 
which arguably should be characterized as "property" and, thus, in-
cluded in the estate of a debtor who "owns" the property. 
A. CyberProperty 
Because of the Intemet,73 people and businesses now own or 
use things that did not exist when the Code was enacted twenty 
years ago. During the last decade, we have witnessed an explosion 
in the number of businesses that exist solely or primarily on the In-
temet.74 In addition, many people access valuable password-
protected information at Internet web sites while others are mem-
bers of a "closed" subscription list that prescreens members before 
allowing them to join the discussion group. 
Given the presence of the Internet and the World Wide Web in 
the lives of both modem businesses and individuals, a bankruptcy 
judge will eventually face the daunting task of determining how to 
characterize property a cybercompany owns, whether intangible 
technoproperty should be included in the debtor's estate, and, if so, 
how to value that property. Likewise, a future bankruptcy court may 
be asked to determine the relative interests a debtor and other par-
ties have in the "right" to access password-protected Internet infor-
mation or the right to control who can join or participate in the dis-
cussions involving a closed subscription list. 
1. CyberCompanies 
Though "cybercompanies" are the current darlings of Wall 
Street,75 few companies have actually made a profit based solely on 
" The Internet generally is described as a worldwide network connecting thousands of 
independent computer networks and millions (perhaps billions) of computers. See generally 
Deborah Howitt, War.com: Why the Battles Over Domain Names 'Will Never Cease, 19 
HAsTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 719, 720 (1997). 
74 See G. Christian Hill, Technology (A Special Report): The Battle for Control, WALL 
ST.]., Nov. 18, 1996 at R4. 
"' Stock returns for certain cybercompanies from january-November 1998 include: In-
foseek (215%), Lycos (266%), America Online (315%), Yahoo! (583%), and Amazon.com 
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their Internet activities. Internet companies are among the most 
highly-priced stocks on the market even though financial analysts 
generally admit that they do not know what the companies are 
worth.76 That financial analysts cannot confidently value cybercom-
panies is not surprising, since most of these companies have gener-
ated little earnings and, thus, have never made a profit. 77 Cyber-
companies seem to be highly valued because of investors' view of 
their projected growth, not because of current profits. Indeed, the 
stock price of some cybercompanies increased even as the compa-
nies posted multi-million dollar quarterly or annuallosses.78 Valua-
tion is challenging even for companies with reported profits. Many 
cybercompanies own only intangible property, which is not always 
easy to value.79 For example, though the proposed sale of Netscape 
Communications Corporation (the maker of a popular web naviga-
tor) suggests that the company has value,80 its assets consist largely of 
software applications, copyrights in those applications, trademarks, 
ownership interests in other cybercompanies, and a limited number 
of computers and leasehold rights.81 
It is inevitable that a major cybercompany will file for bank-
ruptcy.82 When this happens, the court will be forced to value both 
(660%). See Suzanne Woolley, Internet Insanity, MONEY MAG., jan. I999, at 96. 
'" See Woolley, supra note 75, at 99 ("To get a chuckle (or a groan) out of an analyst, 
ask for the best way to value Internet stocks."). 
" See james K. Glassman, At a Loss in Valuing Internet's Darlings, WASH. Posr,July I2, 
I998, at HI. 
"' See id. (observing that the price ofLycos Inc. stock jumped $20 a share even though 
the company lost $9 million the previous year); George Anders, Amazon. com, eBay Post Blaz-
ing Growth-Results of Both Companies Exceed Expectations For the Fourth Quarter, WALL 
ST.j.,Jan. 27, I999 (noting thatAmazon.com Inc. stock rose almost $9 a share after reporting 
a $46.4 million fourth quarter loss on revenue of $252.9 million and a quarterly pro forma 
loss of$22.2 million, or I4 cents a share.). 
"' See Jonathan Pavluk, Computer Software and Tax Policy, 84 COLUM. L. REv. I992, 
2011-I2 (1984) (noting difficulty of characterizing computer software under common law 
model of intangible property). 
"' Netscape is being sold to another cybercompany, America Online, for $4.2 billion. I 
AOL Negotiating Netscape Purchase $4.2 billion threat to Microsoft Dominance, DALLAS 
MOR.'IING NEWS, Nov. 24, I998. 
'' See Netscape Communications Corporation 1997 Annual Report 
<http:/ /www.sec.gov/ Archives/ edgar/ data/944458/000I047469 -98-0I2I70.txt>. 
"' Indeed, a small cybercompany already has filed for bankruptcy relief. On November 
1998, DigiCash Inc. filed for relief under chapter II in the Northern District of California. 
DigiCash owns eCash, an electronic cash product that is used by banks in Europe and Austra-
lia. This product, as well as the patents, protocols, and software systems that DigiCash owns, 
allows Internet users to engage in secure, private cash transactions and electronic voting on-
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the company and its assets. Bankruptcy courts typically rely on 
nonbankruptcy procedures to value property. This reliance may 
not work with a cybercompany valuation because, for now, there is 
no generally accepted way to value cybercompanies outside of bank-
ruptcy. Given the wide disparity between earnings and the stock 
price, it is unclear whether the stock market's valuation of a cyber-
company is reliable. Indeed, given the inflated prices of some cy-
bercompanies' stocks, a bankruptcy judge reasonably could ques-
tion whether it should place any credence in the stock market's 
valuation of a cybercompany. 
For example, stock prices in the summer of 1998 suggested that 
Amazon.com, Inc., an online bookseller which probably has signifi-
cant receivables (but owns no stores and few tangible assets) was 
worth almost as much as the country's two largest booksellers 
(Barnes & Noble, Inc. and Borders Groups, Inc.), which together 
own over two thousand stores (including Waldenbooks, B. Dalton, 
and Doubleday).83 Similarly, based solely on stock prices, Yahoo! 
Inc., which lost $9 million in 1997, was worth more than the New 
York Times Company (which had after-tax-earnings of $262 million 
that year) even though the New York Times owns undeniably valu-
able assets, including the third-highest circulation daily in the coun-
try, the Boston Globe, Golf Digest, and several television and radio 
stations. 84 
Because financial analysts have yet to determine the best way to 
value these companies, it is unclear what a bankruptcy court would 
rely on when placing a value on a cybercompany debtor. Since the 
company will have some assets (though they may all be intangible), 
the court may be forced to value the company based solely on the 
company's assets. Because many cybercompanies own solely or 
primarily intangible property, the court may need to use valuation 
procedures used for valuing intellectual (or other types of intangi-
ble) property when deciding how much a cybercompany is worth. 85 
line. 
" See Glassman, supra note 77, at HI. 
"' See Glassman, supra note 77, at HI. 
"" The procedures used to value intellectual property are themselves fraught with un-
certainty. See infra discussion at Part IV(A) (2) (d). 
1999] From]eans to Genes 301 
2. Domain Names 
a. Generally 
Many companies, and virtually all major companies, have a 
presence on the Internet through their web pages.86 Indeed, a 
quick glance at any major newspaper or magazine reveals that many 
companies now include their web address, or "domain name"87 in 
their advertisements. While many domain names include all (or 
portions of) the company's trade name (i.e., microsoft.com, 
cbs.com) and the company may have trademark registrations that 
coincide with the trade name of the company,88 companies do not 
have an automatic right to use their company's name as their do-
main name. 
To use any name (including a trademark-protected name) as a 
web address, a company must register the domain name with Net-
work Solutions, Inc. (NSI). NSI currently has the exclusive right to 
register certain domain names on a first come, first served basis.89 
"" See Danielle Weinberg Swartz, The Limitations of Trademark Law in Addressing 
Domain Name Disputes, 45 UCLAL. REv. 1487, 1489 (1998) (referring to the Internet as the 
"ultimate marketing tool of the computer age."); Howitt, supra note 73, at 723 (discussing 
growth of the world wide web). 
" While each computer or network linked to the Internet has a unique address (an In-
ternet Protocol number), these numbers are converted into letter names (the "domain 
name"). A domain name consists of two parts: a host and a domain. The Internet is di\ided 
into several top level domains, including .com (commercial business), .net (network or 
communications organization), .edu (educational institution), .gov (government). See gen-
erally Swartz, supra note 86, at 1489-90; Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 287 n.3 
(D.NJ. 1998). Network Solutions, Inc., pro\ides a comprehensive discussion of how domain 
names are characterized as top level or other at its web site. See Glossary of Registra-
tion-Related Terms and Organizations, <http:/ /rs.internic.net/glossary/index.html#dns> 
(last \isited Feb. 10, 1999). 
~ The PTO "'ill not register a domain name that consists of generic or merely descrip-
tive items unless it is connected to, or references, specific goods or senices. See Howitt, su-
pra note 73, at 731. The PTO "'ill, however, register a domain name as a trademark if the 
applicant meets all other trademark registration requirements. See Howitt, supra note 73, at 
731. 
~ NSI currently has a contract with the National Science Foundation to register the 
domain names ending with .com, .org, .net, .edu, and .gov. This may soon change. A \\'bite 
Paper issued by the Department of Commerce recommends that this process be turned over 
to a nonprofit corporation. See Letter from]. Beckwith Burr, Acting Associate Administrator 
of National Telecommunications Information Administration for International Affairs, to Dr. 
Herb Schorr, Executive Director USC Information Sciences Institute, 
<http:/ /www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/press/icann102098.htm>; see also A Proposal to Im-
prol'e Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses Discussion Draft 1/30/98, 
302 BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS jOURNAL [Vol. 15 
To simplify the registration process, NSI does not assess the motives 
of the registrant or attempt to determine whether using the domain 
name would constitute trademark infringement. 90 Because NSI does 
not determine whether a proposed domain name is trademark pro-
tected, it occasionally has been sued by trademark owners for regis-
tering domain names that contain trademark protected terms. 
Courts have fairly consistently held that the mere registration 
of a domain name, without more, does not constitute trademark in-
fringement. 91 In addition, NSI takes the position-and courts gen-
erally have agreed-that it has no duty to determine whether a do-
main name contains terms that, if used, would constitute trademark 
infringement.92 Given this, most courts have held that only the do-
main name holder/infringer can be held liable if using a properly 
registered domain name infringes a trademark owner's rights. In 
general, courts will find that using a domain name constitutes 
trademark infringement if a business registers the name of a com-
petitor and using the domain name is likely to confuse internet us-
ers.93 Similarly, if the Internet site advertises services or products 
<http:/ /www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/dnsdrft.htm> (discussing reasons for 
change, including need for mechanisms to resolve disputes between domain name holders 
and trademark holders). 
90 The registration process is done via e-mail and requires the registrant to enter a pro-
posed domain name into NSI's database. NSI automatically registers the domain name un-
less it has been assigned already, contains words found to be obscene, or matches words that 
are restricted in use by law. See Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Network So-
lutions, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1276, 1277 (1997); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, 
Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 953-54 (C.D. Cal. 1997); see also Network Solutions' Domain Name 
Dispute Policy, <http:/ /rs.internic.net/domain-info/internic-domain-6.html> (last visited 
Feb. 10, 1999). 
91 See, e.g.,Jews for Jesus, 993 F. Supp. at 307; Academy of Motion Picture, 989 F. Supp. 
at 1278-79;Juno Online Servs., L.P. v.Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 684, 691 (N.D. Ill. 
1997); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
"' See Academy of Motion Picture, 989 F. Supp. at 1279-1280 (finding that merely regis-
tering and cataloging domain names does not constitute a violation of the Trademark Anti-
Dilution Act or the Lanham Act); Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at 957 (holding that NSI did 
not infringe mark or make commercial use of mark by merely accepting a domain name reg-
istration). 
93 See, e.g., Jews for Jesus, 993 F. Supp. 282 (granting preliminary injunction to enjoin 
use of domain name jewsfmjesus.org" by domain name holder whose web site presented the 
holder's opposition to the organization jews for Jesus); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Amer-
ica, Inc., v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that using 
"plannedparenthood.com" constituted commercial use of a trademark especially since the 
domain name holder (who opposed a woman's right to choose) admitted that he hoped the 
domain name would confuse people and prevent them from locating Planned Parenthood's 
web page). 
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similar to the trademark holder's services or products, courts typi-
cally will find that using the domain name infringes on the trade-
mark owner's rights.94 Finally, courts routinely find that there has 
been trademark infringement in cases involving "cybersquatters," 
"grabbers," or "hoarders" who register domain names that contain 
trademark protected terms, claim an ownership interest in those 
names, then attempt to ransom the grabbed name to the trademark 
holder.95 
b. Process of Transferring a Domain Name 
To transfer a domain name to another entity, NSI requires the 
domain name holder to complete a Registrant Name Change 
Agreement.96 Though NSI does not "own" the domain name, it 
takes the position that the domain name holder does not own it ei-
ther. Instead, NSI characterizes the domain name registration as a 
contract between NSI and the domain name holder, and, as a result, 
takes the position that a domain name holder cannot unilaterally 
transfer a domain name to a third party. 97 According to NSI, a do-
main holder cannot sell its rights under the contract to a third party 
"like tangible property" because NSI views itself as a contracting 
party that is "directly affected" by a sale or transfer of the domain 
"' See Swartz, supra note 86, at 1495 n.29 (discussing dispute between Princeton Review 
(the domain name holder of kaplan.com) and Stanley Kaplan, Co., Princeton's primary 
competitor). 
"' See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 999 F. Supp. 1337, 1342 (C.D. Cal. 1998) 
(defining cybersquatter and finding trademark dilution and ordering registrant to transfer 
domain name to trademark holder for nominal amount); Intematic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. 
Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. lll 1996); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 
(C.D. Cal. 1996). In a recently filed lawsuit, Omega Protein Corp. sought class certification 
on behalf of anyone whose trademark or trade name has been misappropriated or diluted by 
a cybersquatter or domain name broker. Omega Protein Corp. v. Flom, No. H-98-3114 (S.D. 
Tex. filed Sept. 18, 1998). Similarly, Microsoft sued several domain name brokers who alleg-
edly stockpiled domain names that contained trademark protected terms. Microsoft Corp. v. 
Karr, Omega Protein Corp. v. Flom, No. H-98-D425 (filed Dec. 21, 1998). Though courts 
routinely rule against cybersquatters, they typically will not find that using a domain name 
that contains a trademark-protected term constitutes trademark infringement if the registrant 
has a legitimate right to use the name to advertise a product or service different from the 
trademark owner's. See Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epiz., Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1331 (D. 
Or. 1997) (permitting theatre group to use mark of company that sells circuit boards and 
computer programs); see also Swartz, supra note 86, at 1495-96. 
"' See Network Solutions Registrant Name Change Agreement, 
<http:/ /rs.intemic.net/reg-change/agreement.html> (last visited Feb. 10, 1999) . 
., See id. 
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name.
98 Under this view, what a domain name holder has or may be 
deemed to own is a potentially transferable right to renew the regis-
tration of a domain name. 
c. Are Domain Names ''Property"? 
Given the importance of online advertising and product or 
service "branding" (i.e., having an easily accessible domain name 
that users relate to a product or service),99 one of the most valuable 
assets a company may "own" is its domain name.100 Viewing a do-
main name as property squarely conflicts with a narrow conceptu-
alization of property as a fixed, tangible object. Under the common 
law's more expansive "bundle of rights" conceptualization of prop-
erty, however, a domain name (or, at least, the right to use the do-
main name) would be property because a holder has the right to 
use it, exclude others from using it, and transfer it to another en-
tity.101 As such, the holder's rights in the domain name are substan-
tially similar to the rights a tenant has in a lease, a business has in an 
advertising sign/02 a business has in a telephone number/03 or a li-
"' Seeid. 
99 See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 951-52 (C.D. 
Cal. 1997) (discussing importance of the Web as a medium for advertising and for direct con-
sumer access to goods and services). 
100 See id. at 957 (comparing domain name address to "vanity" telephone numbers and 
noting that both are valuable business assets). 
101 If, as the author argues, a holder's right to use a domain name is property, then the 
holder should also have the right to grant a creditor a security interest in this property. 
Though no cases were found involving the ability to grant, or the validity of, a security interest 
in a domain name, there is no reason to treat this type of intangible property any differently 
than other forms of intangible property (in which a creditor can obtain a security interest). 
However, somewhat like trademarks that cannot be assigned "in gross," the value of the do-
main name apart from the association with a particular product/ company may be of negligi-
ble value to the secured party. See infra discussion at III(A) (2) (d). 
102 See Naegele Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Durham, 803 F. Supp. 1068 (M.D. N.C. 
1992) (treating outdoor advertising sign as property interest of both advertiser and sign 
owner). 
103 See Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675, 677-78 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(finding competitor's use of a telephone number combination constituted either trademark 
infringement or unfair competition); In re Metropolitan Alarm Corp., 528 F.2d 908, 910 (1st 
Cir. 1976) (recognizing debtor's property interest in telephone number); Murrin v. Midco 
Communications, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1195, 1199-1201 (D. Minn. 1989) (enjoining competi-
tor's use of similar telephone number); SODIMA v. International Yogurt Co., 662 F. Supp. 
839,852-54 (D. Or. 1987) (recognizing common law trademark right in telephone number); 
American Airlines, Inc. v. A 1- 800-A-M-E-R-I-C-A-N Corp., 622 F. Supp. 673, 684-86 (N.D. Ill. 
1985) (enjoining travel agency from using telephone number similar to airline). But cf. 
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censee has in intellectual property. 
While nonbankruptcy law may not have determined the extent 
to which a domain name holder can sell or grant a security interest 
in a domain name, some bankruptcy trustees have argued success-
fully that a debtor's interest in a domain name is included in the 
bankruptcy estate.104 Though courts have not treated the domain 
name itself as property of the estate, trustees have convinced courts 
that a debtor's interest in a domain name is an executory contract 
which can be assumed by the debtor just like other contracts involv-
ing tangible or intangible property.105 This treatment is consistent 
with the Code's broad conceptualization of property. 
That is, while the Act excluded from the estate any property 
that could not be transferred under nonbankruptcy law, the Code 
includes such property in the estate. Even if the Code includes 
generally nontransferable property in the estate and permits the 
trustee to sell the property, the trustee nonetheless must comply 
with any contractual provision that places restrictions on the man-
ner in which the original party can transfer the property, or condi-
tions that must be satisfied before the property can be transferred.106 
Thus, it is not surprising that courts have concluded that a chapter 7 
trustee who seeks to assume and assign a debtor's rights in the do-
main name must comply with NSI's transfer procedures.107 
Dranoff-Perlstein Associates v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 855-63 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding no property 
or trademark protected interest in telephone numbers with generic terms); Southwestern 
Bell Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Wilkins, 920 S.W.2d 544, 549 (Mo. Ct. App. I996) (same); Cyta-
novich Reading Center v. Reading Game, 208 Cal. Rptr. 4I2, 415-16 (Cal. Ct. App. I984) 
(same); see also Anthony L. Fletcher & David]. Kera, The Forty-Third Year of Administration 
of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 59 I, 675-76 (I990) (discussing 
general topic of granting trademark protection to telephone numbers that contain generic 
terms). 
'"' While there do not appear to be any published court opinions on this, the author 
learned in a conversation with an attorney for NSI that this issue has been raised in several 
bankruptcy cases in the Northern District of Virginia (where NSI is located). 
'"' See II U.S.C. § 365(a) (I994) ("[T]he trustee, subject to the court's approval, may 
assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor."). 
'"" See William M. Winter, Preserving the Benefit of the Bargain: The Equitable Result, 
I3 BA.'IKR. DEV.J. 543 (I997). 
'"' While the Code will not enforce any provision in an executory contract that purports 
to extinguish or limit the debtor's contractual rights solely because the debtor filed for bank-
ruptcy, a debtor in possession or trustee who assumes an executory contract must comply with 
all contractual terms. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(I) ("Notwithstanding a provision in an execu-
tory contract ... an executory contract ... may not be terminated or modified, and any right 
or obligation under such contract ... may not be terminated or modified ... solely because 
of a prO\ision in such contract ... that is conditioned on ... the commencement of a case 
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Though courts may not characterize a domain name as 
"property" that a holder can sell, and the NSI contract may view a 
domain name holder as a temporary licensee who lacks the ability 
to unilaterally "sell" a domain name, some domain name holders 
currently have placed "their" domain names up for sale. For exam-
ple, the holder of the domain name "computer. com" has offered to 
sell that name to the highest bidder. 108 Indeed, the only informa-
tion contained at the web site is a sale notice that generally discusses 
the importance of online branding, stresses the value of this particu-
lar domain name, and offers the name for sale to either a startup or 
established company for the minimum cash price of $500,000.109 
Likewise, the holder of "beef.com" has offered to sell that name for 
$2,500,000, to rent it for a monthly fee, no or to enter into a profit-
sharing arrangement with prospective developers of the web site.m 
d. Valuing Domain Names 
Even if the domain name holders of "computer.com" and 
''beef. com" are correct in their belief that they have the right to sell 
those names and that those names are worth hundreds of thousands 
of dollars, it is not clear what process a bankruptcy court should use 
to value a domain name. The debtor and trustee would most likely 
hire experts to testify about issues such as the income the debtor 
derived from sales purchased at the web site, the number of hits at 
the site, n 2 advertising income the debtor received from the site, the 
uniqueness of the relationship of the domain name to the company 
and its affiliates, etc. Because of the similarity between the 
under this title."). 
106 See<http://www.computer.com> (lastvisitedjan. 4, 1999). 
109 See id. 
no The page can be rented for $500 per month for 1 to 2 months, $3750 per month for 
3 to 5 months, or $2,500 per month for 6 to 12 months. See <http://www.beef.com> (last 
visited jan. 25, 1999). 
m See id. ("For Partnership: Profit-sharing possibilities for prospective developers of 
this web site. Inquire within.") Other domain names listed for sale include pizza. com (asking 
price $300,000), real-estate.com (asking price $150,000), and washdc.com (asking price 
$50,000). See <http://www.pizza.com> (lastvisitedjan. 25, 1999). 
m While the easiest way to quantifY the value of a cybercompany may be by measuring 
the number of times users visit the site (the "hits"), this quantification process still begs the 
question of how best to value a "hit." The author is grateful to Michael A. Condyles for this 
observation and to two other members of the Board of Governors of the Bankruptcy Section 
of the Vrrginia State Bar (Dale A. Davenport and jeffrey L. Tarkenton) for sharing their views 
on cybercompany valuations. 
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"property" characteristics of domain names and intellectual prop-
erty (e.g., necessary and inherent exclusivity), courts also could base 
their domain name valuation method on the methods courts use to 
value intangible property. 
Valuing intellectual property is complex, and almost always will 
require expert testi.mony.113 Moreover, two major difficulties are 
posed when experts attempt to value intellectual property. First, the 
value of an intellectual property asset typically is highest when it is 
being used, rather than when it is liquidated or shifted to a different 
purpose.114 Second, valuing intellectual property is challenging be-
cause most intangible assets are created for a specific purpose and 
within a particular enterprise and, thus, may have litde value outside 
th .. al . 115 e ongm enterpnse. 
It is possible that these two problems also would complicate any 
attempt to value a domain name. Many domain names contain the 
trade name of the domain name holder. These domain names may 
have litde (or at least a diminished) value if the domain name 
holder is being liquidated in a chapter 7 proceeding, but the trustee 
seeks to "sell" the domain to another entity who will put it to a dif-
ferent use. Indeed, it is likely that some domain names have litde 
value unless they are used (and thus sold) with the holder's other 
tangible and intangible property.116 A simple example will demon-
strate the potential difficulty of selling a domain name independ-
endy of the other assets associated with the domain name. 
Assume Microsoft filed for bankruptcy and that it either is be-
ing liquidated in chapter 7 or that it is reorganizing in chapter 11 
but needs to sell some of its assets, including its domain name, 
"microsoft. com." Assume further that the likely buyers of the do-
main name are established computer companies (that already have 
an established presence on the web on their own web pages) and an 
upstart, relatively unknown cybercompany (with no web presence). 
While the domain name "microsoft.com" dearly has value, and the 
established companies probably could pay a higher price for the 
"' See 6A WILLI.A..'d L. NORTON,JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 2D § 151:48 
(1997). 
'" Seeid. 
"' Seeid. 
"• It also is possible that courts ultimately may conclude that domain names, like trade-
marks, cannot be sold in gross and that any sale of the domain name must be accompanied 
by a sale of the goodwill and other assets of the domain name holder. See supra note 18 and 
accompanying text. 
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name, it is unclear how valuable the domain name would be to a 
company that already has, and ostensibly profits from using, an ex-
isting domain name. Indeed, given the importance of branding, it 
probably would be counter-productive for a company with an estab-
lished web presence to confuse its customers by suddenly shifting to 
another domain name. While the relatively unknown upstart com-
puter company would have less money to bid for the domain name, 
it may actually place a higher value on the name. At least until In-
ternet users realize that the domain name is no longer associated 
with Microsoft, the upstart company's web presence will increase 
because it will receive a relatively large number of "hits" at the mi-
crosoft.com web site even if Microsoft has been liquidated in bank-
ruptcy. 
It may actually be easier to value a domain name that is not 
connected with, and does not depend on, the trade name of the 
holder. That is, the generic nature of popular terms contained in 
some domain names may make them as attractive (and valuable) to 
a number of companies in the same industry as the original holder 
and, indeed, may make it easier to value the domain name because 
the name itself (not the goodwill associated with the holder) causes 
users to visit the site. 117 Perhaps the best illustration of this involves 
a domain name that advertises a product for the only industry that 
(at least for now) consistently makes money on the Internet: por-
nography.118 
One domain name that undoubtedly receives a number of 
"hits"-because it will be the first web page that will be displayed 
when a user types in just the word "sex"-is "sex.com."119 The do-
main name holder, Ocean Fund International, Ltd., (OFIL), will 
profit from being the holder of that domain name even though 
most users probably do not associate the "sex.com" with OFIL and 
117 Generic or merely descriptive terms are not registrable as trademarks (without estab-
lished secondary meaning for the latter). Nonetheless, those terms may be desirable and reg-
istrable as a domain name. See supra note 88. 
us See The Sex Industry: Giving the Customer What He Wants, 346 ECONOMIST 8055, 
Feb. 14, 1998 ("Well-run pornographic websites are the most profitable places on the Inter-
net"); M.L. Lyke, Wired for Sex a Growing Cyberpom Empire in Seattle Takes a New Twist on 
an Old Trade, SEATILE POST-!NTEWGENCER, Apr. 27, 1998, at Dl ("Pornography, which has 
pushed many of the technological innovations on the Internet, is one of the few industries 
turning a profit in the bedeviling world of cyberspace."). 
u• Indeed, the author was told by an intellectual property lawyer that one of the reasons 
that domain names that end with ".com" are highly valued is because of this default function. 
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probably do not visit the site because of their knowledge of the spe-
cific products or services OFIL sells or provides at that site. Thus, 
this domain name is completely unrelated to the registered owner's 
company name, and does not depend on the owner's value or 
goodwill. Because of the name, however, it would be valuable to 
any number of companies-as long as those companies operate (or 
want to operate) a pornographic web site.120 Other domain names 
that are probably valuable, and no doubt receive a number of "hits" 
because of the common terms in the name, include White-
house.com,121 fat.com,122 diet.com,123 travel.com,124 car.com,125 and, 
Christmas.com.126 
3. Right to Access or Control Internet Information 
Because the Internet is open to virtually anyone who has com-
puter access to it, some web sites restrict access by requiring users to 
have a password to either use the site or see certain information at 
the site. If a person who holds a password that gains access to valu-
able information at a web site files for bankruptcy, the password it-
self should arguably be treated as property. It is unclear, however, 
who actually owns the password. 
'"' That the domain name is valuable is demonstrated by the fact that it currently is in 
litigation. Plaintiffs have sued NSI, Ocean Fund International and several related entities in 
federal court in California asserting that they are the rightful owners of the domain name and 
that the name was fraudulently transferred by NSI to Ocean Fund International. See Kremen 
v. Cohen, No. 98-20718800 (Bankr. N.D. Calif.). 
m A pornographic site which probably receives a number of hits from users who do not 
realize that the official web page for the White House ends with the second domain level 
".org." 
m This "Rubenesque" pornographic site is registered to National Telephone Enter-
prises. The author learned about this deceptively titled domain name from one of her re-
search assistants, who revealed the shock one of the research assistant's friends experienced 
when she stumbled upon this site while searching the Internet for weight loss programs. The 
author is especially grateful to the good humor displayed by this particular research assistant 
(who, at her request, will not be specifically named in this foomote) as she dutifully carried 
out the somewhat embarrassing task of researching sex. com and other similar web sites. 
"' A web site, registered to National A-1 Advertising, which advertises the weight loss 
product Herbalite. 
"' A web site, registered to Travel Online, which provides online travel senices. 
'~' A web site, registered to International Resource Network, Inc., which advertises the 
1999 North American International Auto Show. 
'"' A web site, registered to Internet Presence & Publishing, Inc., which advertises 
Christmas products. 
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If the holder "owns" the password, then it ostensibly should be 
included as property of the estate to be sold to the highest bidder-
even if the highest bidder would be denied access to the site from 
the entity that issued the password to the debtor. In contrast, if the 
password is viewed as a trade secret that is owned by the entity that 
issued the password or if the password holder is treated as a tempo-
rary licensee, then the password would arguably not be included in 
the estate. The right to use the password, however, should be 
treated as an executory contract that should be included in the es-
tate. 
An equally unclear problem is who "owns" a closed subscrip-
tion list for a discussion group. While some subscription lists allow 
any interested user to join the list, some lists pre-screen potential 
members. Who is allowed to join the list is determined, in most 
cases, by the person who controls or maintains the list.127 The per-
son who controls the list can prevent potentially hostile members 
from joining the list. In contrast, subscribers to the list have no 
control over who else joins the list or, in fact, who controls the list. 
From the perspective of members of a closed subscription list that 
addresses sensitive topics, who controls the list may be important. 
For example, assume that "Dylan" maintains a closed subscrip-
tion list for people who support affirmative action and that mem-
bers often discuss strategies they are developing for thwarting at-
tempts to curtail affirmative action programs. If the right to control 
the list is viewed as property of Dylan's estate, the bankruptcy trus-
tee arguably should be allowed to sell that right-even to a person 
who opposes affirmative action. It may be that few people outside 
of the members of most discussion groups actually place any value 
on the members' online discussion. It is at least possible, however, 
that a person who is not sympathetic to the views presented or dis-
cussed by members of the list would be willing to "purchase" the 
right to control the list simply to gain access to the information that 
is disseminated by members of the list.128 If the trustee tried to "sell" 
"' For example, the author is a member of a discussion group that discusses HIV-related 
issues. To join this list, she had to submit an online "application" that explained that she is a 
member of the board of an AIDS Services Organization and that she conducts a seminar enti-
tled "HIV I AIDS and Its Legal Issues" for that group. Mter justifying her interest in joining 
the list, she was allowed to join. 
,,. One could argue, of course, that even members of a closed subscription list should 
heed the oft-stated admonition that one should not discuss anything on the Internet that you 
would not want to see published on the front page of the New York Times. 
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Dylan's right to control the list, members of the list most likely 
would attempt to prevent the sale129 and would argue that the right 
to control the list is not Dylan's personal property because their 
ownership interest in the list at least equals any interest Dylan 
holds.130 
4. Conclusion 
Though the Code has a comprehensive definition of "property" 
of the estate, it does not define what constitutes property. Because 
§ 541 of the Code contains a broad, all-inclusive definition of prop-
erty of the estate, there is no reason that a debtor's ownership of, or 
interests in, cyberproperty should not be included in the debtor's 
estate.m Even with a clear conceptualization of "property," how-
ever, it is likely that the court who is assigned the first major bank-
ruptcy case involving cyberproperty will have difficulty valuing this 
property. 
B. Property Created by Biotechnology 
Just as advances in computer-based technology have created 
new industries, biotechnology has made it possible for scientists to 
create new "things" which largely defy being characterized as 
"person" or "property." Specifically, modern research involving 
human and animal reproduction now make it possible to create a 
future life by freezing ova and sperm or by engineering an embryo 
outside of a woman's womb. Likewise, because of advances in bio-
technology, scientists are now using genetic material in ways un-
heard of one hundred years ago. Because technological develop-
ments are developing faster than the legal or ethical rules that 
'"' The business in In re Cult Awareness, 151 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998), made a somewhat 
similar argument. The debtor in that case was an anti-cult organization that was liquidating 
in chapter 7. The court allowed the trustee to sell the debtor's trade name to an entity al-
leged to be a cult over the debtor's contention that there was a good possibility that the name 
"will be put to misleading and unscrupulous purposes." Id. at 609. 
'"' Of course, if this fails and the members of the group discover that Dylan's right to 
control the list has been sold to a hostile third-party, they can then simply refuse to partici-
pate in any further online discussions or could start another discussion group controlled by a 
more sympathetic ear. 
"' For a general discussion of whether web sites should be construed as property, see I. 
Trotter Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Web Sites, 1996 J. ONLINE L. art.7, 
<http:/ /www.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/hardy.htrnl> (last visited Feb. 10, 1999). 
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govern the things technology creates, courts are increasingly finding 
themselves embroiled in disputes involving legal rights in property 
created by biotechnology. 
1. Frozen Embryos 
Neither the medical, the legal, nor the ethics community has 
arrived at a consensus on the rights that people, medical clinics, or 
the government has in frozen ova, sperm, or human embryos.132 
Frozen embryos are created through the in vitro fertilization proce-
dure which involves stimulating a woman's ovaries to produce mul-
tiple ova then removing the eggs to a glass dish, where sperm is 
then introduced.133 Once the sperm cell fertilizes the egg, the fu-
sion (pre-zygote) divides until several pre-zygotes are formed. 134 
These pre-zygotes may then be cryopreserved (i.e., frozen) in liquid 
nitrogen for later use by the couple.135 
Most disputes over the "ownership" of frozen embryos arise 
when the married couple who froze the embryos is divorcing, and 
one partner wants the embryos destroyed, while the other wants to 
either implant the embryos or donate the embryos to third parties. 
As is true in other aspects of divorce proceedings, courts have relied 
on state law to determine who owns the embryos and whether the 
other party has any rights in the embryos. 
The first dispute over frozen embryos actually did not arise in a 
divorce case. In York v. ]ones/36 the federal court was required to 
determine whether the couple or the clinic that had possession of 
the embryos had the right to keep the embryos. When the couple 
sought to transfer one of the embryos to another facility, the clinic 
'" See Kathleen R Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and 
the Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 193 (1997) (discussing whether frozen embryos 
should be classified as persons or property); Maria R Durant, Cryopreservation of Human 
Embryos: A Scientific Advance, A judicial Dilemma, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 707, 725-26 (1990) 
("Both research and ethics committees have been unable to arrive at a consensus on rights of 
ownership in human embryos" and "the judiciary is reluctant to label the embryo as personal 
property."); see also John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Le-
gal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 939 (1986). 
"' See John A. Robertson, Decisional Authority Over Embryos and Control of IVF 
Technology, 28JURIMETRICSJ. 285,287 (1988). 
"' See id. 
"' See id. 
136 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
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refused. 137 The couple then sued the clinic for breach of contract 
and detinue (for wrongfully retaining the embryo) .138 Because the 
litigants entered into a "Cryopreservation Agreement," the court 
could avoid deciding whether the embryo constituted property, a 
person, or something else. Instead, the court held that the agree-
ment created a bailment relationship and that, under applicable 
state law, the clinic-bailee had an obligation to return the subject 
matter of the bailment (i.e., the frozen embryo) to the bailors once 
the bailment terminated.139 
Perhaps the frozen embryos case that received the most public-
ity involved the divorce between Junior Davis and his ex-wife, Mary 
Sue.140 During their divorce proceeding, Mary Sue asked the court 
to award her the couple's frozen embryos so she could donate them 
to a childless couple.141 Junior objected to her request and sought 
custody of the embryos so he could prevent them from being im-
planted.142 The Tennessee Supreme Court was asked to determine 
whether the frozen embryo was a person (and thus should not be 
destroyed as Junior requested), property, or something else.143 The 
court concluded that frozen embryos are not "strictly speaking, ei-
ther 'persons' or 'property,' but occupy an interim category that en-
titles them to special respect because of their potential for human 
life. "144 This court, like the Jones court, concluded that it would be 
bound to enforce any agreement the parties executed concerning 
the disposition of the frozen embryos.145 Because the couple did not 
execute such an agreement, the court ultimately awarded custody of 
the embryos to Junior because of its interpretation of his constitu-
'" See id. at 425. 
"" See id. at 423. 
'"' See id. at 425. 
"" See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
"' See id. at 590. 
w Seeid. 
"-' See id. at 594. 
"' Id. at 597; see also Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 1998) (concluding that the 
frozen embryos are not recognized as persons for constitutional purposes). But see LA. REv. 
STAT. A. .. N. § 130 (West 1998) ("An in vitro fertilized human ovum is a juridical person which 
cannot be owned by the in vitro fertilization patients who owe it a high duty of care and pru-
dent administration."). 
'" See Da~is, 842 S.W. 2d at 598; see also Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 182 (enforcing par-
ties' agreement to donate untransferred frozen embryos to an in vitro fertilization program 
for research). 
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tional right to procreational autonomy.146 
Courts are equally perplexed over the legal treatment that 
should be accorded human sperm. Though males have long had 
the right to sell (or donate) their sperm, 147 courts generally have not 
considered the scope of a male's property interests in human 
sperm. The courts in Hall v. Fertility Insti.tute148 and Hecht v. 
Kane149 somewhat addressed the issue when they considered 
whether to enforce a decedent's will that provided that cryogeni-
cally preserved sperm be given to the decedent's girlfriend over the 
objection of the decedent's surviving children. In attempting to 
analyze the nature of property rights in semen, the court in Hecht 
characterized sperm as a unique type of property and recognized 
that the "present legal position toward property rights in the human 
body is unsettled and reflects no consistent philosophy or ap-
proach. "150 Despite the unsettled nature of the law, both courts ul-
timately concluded that the decedent had an ownership interest in 
his sperm at the time of death and that this interest constituted 
property that could be distributed as part of his estate.151 
To date, few state statutes address the legal status, if any, to ac-
cord ova, sperm, or frozen embryos. The statutes that do exist ap-
pear to have been enacted as part of an ongoing dispute over abor-
tion rights or because of legislators' fears about the potential of 
human cloning. Thus, the statutes that regulate ova, sperm, and 
human embryos state that the embryos are humans152 which cannot 
be sold for non therapeutic purposes153 or intentionally destroyed.154 
146 See Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 602..04. 
'" The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) permits a willing donor to transfer semen 
or other replenishing tissues such as blood or plasma with or without consideration. See 
generally Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and 
the Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 193 (1997); Bonnie Steinbock, Sperm as Prop-
erty, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y. REv. 57 (1995). 
,.. 647 So. 2d 1348 (La. Ct. App. 1994). 
"
9 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
150 Id. at 281. 
"' See id. at 850; Hall, 647 So.2d at 1351. 
"' See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 121 (West 1998) (defining human embryo as "an in vitro 
fertilized human ovum, with certain rights granted by law, composed of one or more living 
human cells and human genetic material so unified and organized that it will develop in 
utero into an unborn child"); see also id. § 123 ("An in vitro fertilized human ovum exists as a 
juridical person until such time as the in vitro fertilized ovum is implanted in the 
womb .... "). 
"' See id. § 122 ("The sale of a human ovum, fertilized human ovum, or human embryo 
is expressly prohibited."); FL. STAT. ANN. § 873.05(1) (West 1998) (making it a felony to 
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It is unclear what a bankruptcy court would rely on if it had to 
decide whether a debtor's ova, sperm, or frozen embryos should be 
treated as property of the estate.155 If a court treats these excised 
body materials as "property" and the body materials are valuable, 156 
the bankruptcy court also would need to decide if a trustee could 
sell the ova, sperm, or embryo to the highest bidder. Given the lack 
of clarity in reported judicial decisions and the paucity of state statu-
tory law, bankruptcy courts will have little assistance from nonbank-
ruptcy characterizations of these materials. Bankruptcy courts could 
potentially rely on arguments raised by academic commentators. 
While commentators have not addressed this issue in detail, some 
have suggested that "owners" of frozen embryos should have the 
right to sell or otherwise dispose of their frozen embryos as they so 
choose. 157 The American Bar Association may also weigh in on this 
matter, as it is considering a policy on frozen embryos. Unfortu-
nately, the policy only addresses the relative rights between the 
spouses in a divorce dispute.158 As the policy will not address 
knowingly offer to purchase or sell a human embryo for valuable consideration); see also 
CAliF. HEALTH & SAFEITCODE § 24185 (West 1998) (prohibiting the sale of embryos for the 
purpose of cloning human beings); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 333.2690 (West 1998) (prohibiting 
the sale of embryos for use in non therapeutic research). 
"' See LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 129 ("A viable in vitro fertilized human ovum is a juridical 
person which shall not be intentionally destroyed by any natural or other juridical person or 
through the actions of any other such person."). 
'" The only reported bankruptcy opinion involving frozen embryos involved a dispute 
between creditors who claimed a priority lien in frozen bovine embryos. See In re Stookey 
Holsteins, 112 B.R. 942 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990); see also Fairview State Bank v. Edwards, 739 
P.2d 994 (Okla. 1987) (answering certified question from bankruptcy court concerning the 
security interest in proceeds from the sale ofbo\ine embryos). 
'"' See Amy Virshup, How much would you pay for this family? For the millions of 
Americans who suffer from some form ofinfertility, the quest for children has become a mat-
ter of both high technology and high finance, SMART MONEY, Dec. I, 1998, at 132 (stating that 
ova prices in New York have risen to $5,000 each and that a fee of $25,000 was recently being 
offered to a "healthy, intelligent college student or college graduate, age 21-33, with blue eyes 
and blonde or light brown hair" by someone looking for Ivy League ova and observing that a 
5cc \ial of frozen sperm costs $188 and donors get $35-$50 per "deposit" visit); Adrienne 
Knox, What's a human egg worth? Debate Intensifies, STAR-TRIBUNE (Mpls.-St. Paul), Apr. 5, 
1998, at EOI (discussing advertisement in the Princeton University newspaper calling for an 
ova plus expenses totaling $35,000 from an "attractive, intelligent woman with proven fertil-
it:y" and reporting that ova in Minnesota were being sold for $1,500). 
"' See Robertson, supra note 133, at 298 (arguing that purchasing embryos should be 
allowed just as physicians are paid to treat infertility with IVF technology); Natalie K. Young, 
Frozen Embryos: New Technology Meets Family Law, 21 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 559, 584 
(1991) ("[I]n the absence of state regulation and as long as the use is reasonable, the egg and 
sperm pro\iders would have unlimited rights of ownership in the frozen embryo."). 
'"' See Richard Carelli, ABA Drafting Policy on Custody of Frozen Embryos in Dimrce, 
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whether frozen embryos should be treated as a person, property, or 
something else, it will be of little guidance to any bankruptcy court 
that may find itself faced with such property in a debtor's estate. 
State and federal courts have been unwilling to label frozen 
embryos as personal property, largely because of their reluctance to 
make decisions based on moral or ethical considerations. Ostensi-
bly, a bankruptcy court could take the same approach and refuse to 
treat these items as property on public policy grounds. Given the 
Code's comprehensive conceptualization of property, however, a 
bankruptcy court should not exclude potentially valuable property 
from the estate unless it is clear that either state or federal law159 
would not treat the item as property and would not allow the prop-
erty to be sold to the highest bidder. 
2. Genetic Material 
The medical, legal, and bioethics communities are also strug-
gling with whether it is proper to characterize human cells and ge-
netic information as "property."160 Few dispute that people have a 
virtually unfettered right to donate or sell disease-free blood. 161 In-
PITISBURGH POST-GAZETIE, Feb. 2, 1998, at A6; see also Michelle F. Sublett, Frozen Embryos: 
What are They and How Should the Law Treat Them, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 585, 616 (1990) 
(arguing that a frozen embryo should not be treated as a human life and that there should be 
a presumption in divorce proceedings in favor of letting the embryo expire rather than 
bringing the embryo to life). 
159 The National Organ Transplant Act, which prohibits the sale of certain organs 
(kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone and skin), suggests that 
a legislature could restrict the transfer or sale of ova, sperm, or frozen embryos if they chose 
to do so. See The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339, 
2346 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1994)). Organ sales are banned pri-
marily because of the fear that allowing organs to be sold would harm the voluntary organ 
donation system or would encourage the poor to sell their body parts. Arguably, that fear 
would not apply to the sale of genetic material since cells regenerate, are replaceable, and 
removing them does not detrimentally affect the donor's health. See Rhonda G. Hartman, 
Beyond Moore: Issues of Law and Policy Impacting Human Cell and Genetic Research in the 
Age of Biotechnology, 14J. LEGAL MED. 463 (1993). 
160 See Moore v. Regents. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (Arabian,]., concurring) ("The rami-
fications of recognizing and enforcing a property interest in body tissues are not known, but 
are greatly feared-the effect on human dignity of a marketplace in human body parts, the 
impact on research and development of competitive bidding for such materials, and the ex-
posure of researchers to potentially limitless and uncharted tort liability.") see also Hartman, 
supra note 159, at 471-72; Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Genetic Information and Property 
Theozy, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1037 (1993) (arguing that genetic information has many of the 
recognized characteristics of property.). 
161 See 18 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (West 1998) (penalizing the knowing donation or sale (or 
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deed, because, except in limited circumstances, people generally 
cannot be forced to give their blood to a third party, 162 the law gen-
erally recognizes a person's unitary property interest in controlling 
the use or sale of his or her own blood. Although blood contains 
genetic information, only a few states have explicitly protected a 
person's property interest in his or her genetic information.163 
The case that intially triggered the debate was Moore v. Regents 
of University of Califomia.164 The physician in the case obtained his 
patient's (Moore's) consent to remove portions of Moore's spleen 
to treat leukemia without disclosing to Moore that ( 1) he was using 
Moore's genetic material in research, (2) he had entered into a 
commercial contract to develop a cell line using Moore's cells, and 
(3) he had a patented cell line from the cells he took from Moore's 
body.165 Moore sued the physician for breaching his fiduciary duty to 
disclose facts material to Moore's consent and for converting 
Moore's property. 
In a long, complicated multi-opinion decision, the court ulti-
mately concluded that, while the physician had a duty to disclose his 
financial interests to Moore before he obtained Moore's consent to 
surgery, Moore did not have the right to prevent the physician from 
using Moore's genetic material in commercial research.166 While 
the court stated that it was not holding that excised cells "can never 
be property for any purpose whatsoever,"167 it nonetheless rejected 
Moore's conversion claim. In refusing to recognize a property in-
attempt to donate or sell) of blood, semen, tissues, organs, or other bodily fluids by a person 
who has tested positive for the HIV virus); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-7 (West 1998) (making 
the sale of infected blood a Class C felony (if not used) and a Class A felony (if used); ILL. 
CaMP. STAT.§ 5/12-16.2 (West 1998) (making the transmission ofHIV a Class 2 felony); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 (West 1998) (making the exposure of HIV to others a felony with a 
$5,000 fine and up to 10 years in jail); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 39-13-109 (West 1998) (making the 
exposure to HIV a Class C felony). 
"' See MINN. STAT.§ 611A.19 (West 1998) (making HIV testing of sex offender manda-
tory upon request of the victim); N.Y. CRIM. PRO.§ 390.15 (West 1998) (requiring testing for 
HIV in sex crime cases); MISS. CODE ANN.§ 99-19-203 (West 1998) (making HIV testing man-
datory upon conviction of sex crime); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 43-2.2 (West 1998) (requiring HIV 
testing if accused is indicted, charged or convicted of sex crime). 
"' See CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 10-3-1104.7(1)(a) (1998) ("Geneticinformation is the unique 
property of the individual to whom the information pertains .... "); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-
1(1) (1998) ("Genetic information is the unique property of the individual tested .... "). 
,., 793 P.2d 497 (Cal. 1990). 
'" See id. at 149. 
'"" See id. at 164. 
1
"' Id. at 146. 
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terest in genetic materials, the court contended that the patented 
cell line was both "factually and legally distinct" from the cells the 
physicians took from Moore's body.168 In addition to this factual dis-
tinction, the court admitted that it was unwilling to characterize ge-
netic materials as property owned exclusively by the human from 
whom the material is extracted because of its concern that giving 
patients an exclusive property interest in their cells would unduly 
. d di al h 169 1mpe e me c researc . 
If a person with valuable genetic information filed for bank-
ruptcy, the court would need to decide whether-notwithstanding a 
state court's characterization of (or refusal to characterize) the 
property interests in genetic information or human tissues-the ge-
netic information should be included as property of the estate. 
Though this may seem somewhat far-fetched, it is not unreasonable 
to imagine that a future bankruptcy court will be faced with making 
such a determination since there currently are no prohibitions on a 
person's ability to use or to sell her genetic information.170 Likewise, 
this issue could face the bankruptcy court if a patient and a medical 
professional were involved in litigation over the use of genetic ma-
terial and one of the litigants then filed for bankruptcy. Recogniz-
ing and enforcing a property interest in body tissues would move a 
bankruptcy court into virtually unchartered waters and may, in fact, 
require the bankruptcy court to rule on an issue the states have 
avoided.171 Nonetheless, the court could not avoid this determina-
tion because it would need to decide whether genetic material is 
personal property (which should be included in the estate) and 
whether the trustee should be given the right to sell the property for 
the benefit of the creditors. 
168 Seeid. 
169 See id. at 147. 
110 There does not appear to be any prohibition against the sale of human cells and ge-
netic materials. See supra note 159. 
171 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction provides that, in some instances, a federal court 
can refrain from deciding an issue that is under review by an agency that has expertise with 
the issue. See, e.g., In re Buckeye Countrymark, Inc., 227 B.R 498, 499-500 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1998) (deferring to Commodity Futures Trading Commission's expertise on hedge-to-
arrive contracts); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 120 B.R 724, 743 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1990) (deferring to Chicago Board of Trade's expertise on the transferability of a 
member's seat on that board). A bankruptcy court could not rely on this doctrine to avoid 
deciding whether a human embryo is a person, property, or something else. Because state 
courts have elected to dodge this politically volatile issue does not then give federal courts the 
license to dodge it as well. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Recent discussions involving the potential cloning of humans 
suggest that whatever can be done or created eventually will be 
done or created. Thus, looking forward to the next one hundred 
years, bankruptcy judges should prepare themselves to face increas-
ingly complex issues involving property of the estate. As debtors 
who own cyberproperty or property created by various forms of bio-
technology file for bankruptcy, courts will have to consider whether 
certain "things" should be treated as property and, if so, whether a 
trustee should be allowed to sell those things. 
